

A Haystack full of Needles: Scalable Detection of IoT Devices in the Wild

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
European Research Council
Established by the European Commission

EPSRC
Pioneering research
and skills



Northeastern
University

17+ billion IoT devices by 2023



Source: Cisco Annual Internet Report, 2018–2023

Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major Websites Across U.S.



Can we “*identify*” and “*locate*” IoT devices in our networks



We had a collaboration with a large European ISP

IoT device detection: Why at ISP?

- Security & privacy benefits for customers (opt-in)
 - notifying about infected devices *
- Security of ISP's network:
 - incident investigation & resolution

*Cetin et. al, NDSS'19, Cleaning Up the Internet of Evil Things: Real-World Evidence on ISP and Consumer Efforts to Remove Mirai


Detecting IoT Devices at the Provider is Challenging

- Traffic patterns across IoT devices are diverse
- Deploying an agent inside at each ISP customers is not scalable *
- Active measurements do not work with devices behind NAT
- Deep packet inspection raises privacy concerns


*Kumar et al., USENIX Security'19, All Things Considered: An Analysis of IoT Devices on Home Networks

NetFlow captures for IoT-device discovery

- Collected for other operational purposes
- Sampled, no payload
- Header-only:
src_ip, dst_ip, src_port, dst_port,proto...
192.168.1.1,10.1.1.1,12345,1883,TCP




Detection of IoT devices in **limited**, **passive**, and **sparsely sampled** flow data in the **wild**



At what granularities can we detect IoT devices?



How fast can we detect IoT-devices?




How are IoT devices deployed today, as observed in flow data?


Key Insights

- Devices have repeating patterns of communication that appear even in sparsely sampled data
- Detection rules can be generated using limited packet fields
- Detected devices from 77% of studied IoT manufacturers in an ISP and IXP within minutes to hours


IoT Communication Pattern



Overview of Methodology



- ① Generate IoT Traffic
- ② Check Visibility of IoT Traffic at ISP Vantage Point
- ③ Identify Domains, IPs, and Port numbers and Generate Detection Rules
- ④ Cross check Detection Rules
- ⑤ Detect IoT Devices in the Wild



1 Generate Ground Truth (GT) IoT Traffic



2 Check Visibility of GT at ISP Vantage Point



3 Identify Domains, IPs, and Port numbers and Generate Detection Rules



4 Cross check Detection Rules



5 Detect IoT Devices in the Wild

IoT Traffic: Setting up Test Beds

56 IoT Products from 40 Vendors
in 2 Testbeds

13 Cameras

8 Smart Hubs

14 Home Automation

5 TVs

10 Appliances

6 Speakers




IoT Traffic: Triggering Devices

- Idle experiments
- Active experiments: *automated* interaction with the device




Activity	Description
Power	power on/off the device
Voice	voice commands for speakers
Video	record/watch video
On/Off	turn on/off bulbs/plugs
Motion	move in front of device
Others	change volume, browse menu


ISP Setup




IoT labs connected to our Home
(Home VP)* inside ISP network
and capture at ISP routers



*consenting customer




Visibility of IoT Traffic– Unique Devices/Hour




Activity from >64% of devices were observed in each hour

Activity: observing at least one packet to/from device



- 1 Generate IoT Traffic
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- 5 Detect IoT Devices in the Wild

Detection Rules -> Naive Approach



Detection Rules with Naive/IPs Only -> Misclassification

**Partial
coverage**

Observed IPs
in GT can be
incomplete


Dst. IP
Addresses
can change

**Confusing
non-IoT
traffic with
IoT Traffic**

IPs of Generic
domains, e.g.,
Wikipedia.com

IPs of
CDNs/Shared
Infrastructures

Detection Rules: Start with Domains




Granularity of Detection Rules

Product-level: Amazon Echo -> **11 Products**

Manufacturer-level: a Samsung Device -> **20 Manufacturers**


Platform-level: a generic IoT device -> **4 IoT Platforms**
(we can't infer the product type or manufacturer)

77% of the manufacturers in the testbeds



- ① Generate IoT Traffic
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of ISP Subscribers with IoT Devices (Per Hour)




1m+ subscribers with Alexa-enabled devices

- Some diurnal patterns for Alexa and Samsung IoT devices

Alexa-enabled: Any device that responds to Amazon Alexa voice service commands


of ISP-subscribers with IoT Devices (per 24 hours)



Increasing observation period, helped detecting more devices

IoT activity for ~20% of ISP subscriber lines

Breakdown of Detected IoT Devices



Device popularity in the Amazon and ISP look correlated.

Limitations

- Devices relying on shared infrastructure
- Generating rules require studying a range of manufacturers' products
- Domain names and IPs might change
- Detection of devices with small activity

Conclusions

- A methodology to detect IoT devices based on limited, sampled flow data
- Detected devices from more than 77% of studied IoT manufacturers in a large ISP
- 4 million devices were detected (both popular and *not-so-popular*)
- Domains and rules are available at :

<https://moniotrlab.ccis.neu.edu/imc20/>



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